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1. Introduction
Along with its rapid development in recent years, Internet has become an important infrastructure of our daily
life. As a result, cyberspace security has attracted more and more attention from both industrial and academic
ﬁelds. Among all these security issues, service accessibility is one of the most fundamental and essential prob-
lem. Eﬀective attacks such as DDoS, domain hijacking are preformed to degrade the accessibility of a targeted
information system. Besides, the wide adoption of Internet censorship1 also makes the accessibility situation even
worse.
There exists many techniques and practical tools that can help users to circumvent censorship and to improve
accessibility. For example, anonymous communication systems like Tor [1] and JAP [2] can help users get access
to restrictive websites indirectly via a series of proxies. However, most research into improving accessibility
is based on the idea of route redirection and relies on an underlying circumvention proxy infrastructure. The
infrastructure provide users indirect access to restrictive services by relaying the communication between them.
Unfortunately, the openness of the circumvention infrastructure leads to the following situation: on the one hand,
the access points(e.g., relay IP, proxy web URL) to the infrastructure should be advised to a large number of users;
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on the other hand, the adversary can pretend as a normal user and discover these access points then block them.
The main challenge here is to distribute access points to every users while avoid adversaries from enumerating all
of them.
A bunch of resource (referred to as the access points to the circumvention proxy infrastructure) distribution
strategies have been designed with the purpose of ﬁghting enumeration attacks [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10].
For example, Tor only gives the same 3 bridges to users from a given IP subnet within a given time interval
[3]. Recently, to make enumeration attacks more diﬃcult, it requires users to solve an image CAPTCHA before
requesting for bridges [11]. Other well-designed strategies such as keyspace-hopping [5] are also proposed for
the purpose of bounding the enumeration capability of a single user. Besides, social relationships are employed
in the design of resource distribution mechanisms [6] [7] [8] [10] to limit adversary’s ability of creating many
valid Sybil identities. We noticed that, all these strategies are designed with a threat model that the attacker has
bounded capability. When facing a powerful attacker with many valid user identities and large computing/human
investment, these distribution strategies may not perform as well as expected.
Motivated by the possibility of adjusting distribution schemes dynamically with consideration of attack’s a-
bility, this paper steps away from trying to design strategies that outperform current work. Instead, we investigate
into a simple resource distribution strategy and study factors that may inﬂuence service accessibility. We also
present dynamic resource distribution, where the distribution factor can be adjusted according to the estimate for
confrontation situation. Our work provides a supplemental idea for the design of distribution strategies, and the
proof-of-concept experiments validate the eﬀectiveness of this idea. The main contribution of this paper can be
summarized as follows:
• The model of resource distribution problem under enumeration attacks is presented (see Sec. 3.1). We also
give the formalization and evaluation metric for resource distribution strategies based on this model (see
Sec. 3.2).
• Based on the reachability of distributed resources, this paper gives a method to estimate the number of
adversary’s Sybil identities (see Sec. 4.3.1). According to the estimate, a scheme to adjust the resource
distribution strategy dynamically is proposed for the purpose of accessibility improvement (see Sec. 4.3.2).
2. Background and Related Work
Research into resource distribution has had a long history aiming to improve the accessibility of anonymous
communication systems, covert communication systems, anti-censorship systems, etc.. The key challenge here is
that: how can users discover resources eﬃciently without having the adversary discover and block them all.
Tor [1] is one of the most popular low-latency anonymous communication systems in the world. Tor relays
form the basis of Tor network and traﬃc between the sender and receiver is forwarded by them in a hop-by-hop
fashion. The list of all relays is updated and published once an hour, which can help Tor users to choose proper
relays and get anonymous communication services. However, the adversary can also get the relay list and block
access to these relays. In order to improve accessibility, Tor introduced bridge as a blocking-resistant design
[3]. Tor bridges can serve as the ﬁrst hop to access the core Tor network and there exists no public list of them.
They are distributed in an out-of-band manner with well-designed distribution strategies. It gives only 3 bridges
to a user as identiﬁed by a unique IP address subnet or email account. To enumerate all bridges, the adversary
should have access to many IP address subnets or email accounts. Recently, to make enumeration attacks more
diﬃcult, it requires users to solve an image CAPTCHA before requesting for bridges [11]. Similarly, another
popular anonymous communication system JAP [2] also introduced an accessibility-improvement component in
its network, called forwarder [4]. It also adopts CAPTCHA in the distribution of the forwarder nodes [4].
Infranet [12] is a covert communication system that enables user to get access to restrictive sites via cooper-
ation web servers distributed across the global Internet. A proxy discovery mechanism called keyspace hopping
is introduced to distribute access points to Infranet [5]. This mechanism identiﬁes every client and proxy with a
globally unique identiﬁer. Each client can only discover a small fraction proxies whose identiﬁers most closely
follow a index computed from that client’s identiﬁer. This design can eﬃciently limits the number of resources a
Sybil identity can learn from Infranet.
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Recently, some social relationship-based resource distribution strategies were proposes to limit adversary’s
ability of creating many Sybil identities. Besides, the underlying social relationship can also help to manage
user’s trust or even detecting potential Sybil attackers [13] [14] [15]. For example, Psiphon [8] is a web-based
proxy that provide users indirect access to restrictive sites. New users can make a registration and learn the
proxy address only through an invitation by an existing registered user. Another circumvention system named
Kaleidoscope [7] disseminates proxy addresses only to a few high-trust people. These high-trust people perform
random walks based on social relationship to advertise their node addresses which can serve as a internal relay
for others. The state-of-art distribution strategies Proximax [6] and rBridge [10] also leverage social networks for
proxy distribution, aiming to distribute proxies to trusted users eﬃciently.
To sum up, existing strategies are designed to ﬁnd a trade-oﬀ between the two conﬂicting goals in resource
distribution: disseminating resources widely and preventing adversaries from enumerating them. None of them
are trying to survive a powerful adversary who has many valid identities and large computing/human investment.
This forms both the basis of and motivation for this paper. We investigate factors that may inﬂuence service
accessibility and propose dynamic resource distribution, which can adjust the distribution factor based on the
evaluation of the confrontation situation.
3. Accessibility under Resource Enumeration Attack
3.1. Resource distribution model
Fig. 1 gives a general model of the resource distribution problem. There are two types of players in the model:
a distributor who distributes resources of the circumvention proxy infrastructure (abbreviated as infrastructure in
the reminder of this paper); users who requests resources from the distributor. Every user plays the role of either
an honest user or an adversary’s Sybil identity.
Circumvention proxy infrastructure
...
Adversary s Sybil identities
Resource 
Update
Distributor
Resource Distribution Strategy
...
Users
Honest Users
Fig. 1. Resource distribution model under enumeration attacks.
Let U = {u1, u2, · · · , un} to be the user set of the infrastructure, n denotes the total number of users. UH and
US are used to denote the set of honest users and that of adversary’s Sybil identities respectively, UH ∪ US = U,
UH∩US = ∅. The number of honest users and adversary’s Sybils are denoted as nH and nS respectively, nH +nS =
n. R = {r1, r2, · · · , rm} is used to denote the resource set in the infrastructure, and m is the total resource number
at the current time. The resource distribution strategy can be denoted as a function D : (R, ui) → Ri, where
Ri =
{
ri1 , ri2 , · · · , rik
}
is the resource set ui gets from the distributor. k is the distribution parameter, representing
for the number of resources distributed to each user.
There are two causes that can change the status of resources in the infrastructure: resource distribution and
resource update. On the one hand, the adversary can block any resources he gets from the distributor. We present
R˜ to denote resources that are not reachable from the censored region, R˜ ⊆ R. m˜ is used to represent the number of
current unreachable resources, m˜ = |R˜|. On the other hand, the reachability of each resource or even the number
of resources may change due to resource update such as churn, IP reconﬁguration, etc.
3.2. Accessibility Measurement
Accessibility is the ability to get access to the infrastructure. Actually, a honest user ui’s availability of ac-
cessing the infrastructure depends on the reachability of resources he gets from the distributor. Thus, accessibility
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can be deﬁned as the probability that there exists at least one reachable resource in Ri, i.e., the probability that
Ri ∩ (R − R˜)  ∅. Let Pri to denote the probability of ri ∈ R˜. Then, from the perspective of the honest user ui,
accessibility of the infrastructure can be given by (1).
Acc(ui) = 1 −
k∏
j=1
Pri j , ri j ∈ Ri (1)
We provide a summary of the notations used throughout this work in Tab. 1.
Table 1. Notations and the corresponding illustrations used throughout this paper.
Notation Illustration
U = {u1, u2, · · · , un} The user set, |U | = n
UH Honest users, UH ⊆ U, |UH | = nH
US Adversary’s Sybil identities, US ⊆ U, |US | = nS
R = {r1, r2, · · · , rm} The resource set, |R| = m
R˜ Resources that are not reachable, R˜ ⊆ R, |R˜| = m˜
D : (R, ui) → Ri Resource distribution strategy, resources assigned to ui is Ri, |Ri| = k
Pri The probability of ri ∈ R˜
Acc(ui) Infrastructure’s Accessibility from the honest user ui’s view
4. Analyzing and Improving the Accessibility of Service
4.1. Accessibility Analysis
Without loss of generality, we assume the distributor adopts an uniform random distribution strategy. Upon
getting a resource request from the user, the distributor will select k resources from R randomly and disseminate
them to that user. Under this assumption, resources in R are selected and distributed with the same probability
with each other, so the probability of them being assigned to the adversary’s Sybils is the same (as shown in (2)).
For abbreviation, Pr will be used to denote this probability, i.e., the probability of any resource in R is unreachable.
Pr = Pri = Prj , ∀ri, r j ∈ R (2)
For the purpose of preventing enumeration attacks, we assume that the distributor distributes the same k re-
sources to a user (like it is in the Tor bridge distribution strategy [3]) in a given time interval (e.g., 24 hours). In
the same time interval, the distributor will not give new resources to users even if the resources assigned to that
user are all unreachable. For simplicity of analysis, we also assume that, the distributor will cache the resource
update information (such as new resource join-in , resource oﬄine, etc.) until the end of the current time interval.
At the end of current time interval, the distributor will update the resource set R: eliminating the oﬄine resources
and unreachable resources from R; adding new join-in resources to R. Under this assumption, resource distribu-
tion process can be viewed as consisting of a series of time intervals. We can view the distribution within a time
interval as a static problem, and changes only take place between two time intervals.
We consider an aggressive adversary whose Sybil identities request resources from the distributor at the very
beginning of each time interval. And the adversary is eager to block them all after receiving them. This assumption
is reasonable, for in a system that makes no distinction between honest users and Sybil identities, there is no reason
for an adversary to keep a resource alive for longer time. For an adversary with nS Sybil identities, the number of
resources he can get from the distributor who distributes k random resources from R of sizem can be approximately
given by the result of the occupancy problem [16]. The approximate number of the unreachable resources after
enumeration attack in a given time interval is given by (3). And the probability of any resource being blocked and
becoming unreachable is given by (4).
m˜ = m
[
1 − (1 − k/m)nS ] (3)
Pr = m˜/m = 1 − (1 − k/m)nS (4)
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Under the above assumption, the accessibility of the infrastructure from any honest user’s view is the same,
Acc will be used to denote this probability for abbreviation. From (1) and (4), we can conclude that:
Acc = 1 − Prk = 1 − [1 − (1 − k/m)nS ]k (5)
4.2. Factors that inﬂuence accessibility
In (5), there are three factors that inﬂuence the accessibility of the infrastructure.
• nS . Accessibility is negatively correlated with the number of adversary’s Sybil identities. Discovering these
Sybil identities and treating them as a single user may help to improve the infrastructure accessibility. The
thorough investigation into Sybil defense is beyond the scope of this paper (refer to [13] [14] [15] and [17]
for details of Sybil defense methods).
• m. Accessibility is positively correlated with the number of resources in the infrastructure. The more
resources, the more diﬃcult for an adversary to enumerate a considerable fraction of them and degrade
accessibility. Some circumvent tools already realized this correlation and made their eﬀorts to enlarge their
resource numbers.
• k. The number of resources distributed to each user (k) appears twice in (5), and the relationship between it
and accessibility is obscure (as discussed in the following content).
In our research, one reachable resource is enough for a user to get access to the infrastructure. So, the more
resources a user receives, the more possible it can get access to the infrastructure. However, a large k will also
make it easy for an adversary to enumerate more resources thus degrading accessibility. Considering the following
two extreme cases:
1. k = 1. This is the most diﬃcult case for an adversary to enumerate a large fraction of resources. However,
k = 1 also increases the possibility of an honest user being unlucky. If the only resource that a honest user
gets is unreachable, that user will have no access to the infrastructure in this entire time interval.
2. k = m. In this case, every user can get a full list of resources. He can get access to the infrastructure even
if there is only one reachable resource in them. But this also makes it possible for the adversary to get all
resources and block them.
As a result, the distributor should select a proper value for k that maximizes the accessibility of the infrastructure.
4.3. Dynamic resource distribution
To maximize accessibility, k should be selected according to the confrontation situation, i.e., the total resource
number and adversary’s Sybil identities. Fig. 2 presents the idea of dynamic resource distribution. At the end of
the current time interval, the distributor estimates the number of Sybil identities in this time interval. Then, the
optimal value for k is chosen based on distributor’s estimate for the confrontation situation in the following time
interval.
Current
Time Interval
Subsequent
Time Interval ...
1. Estimating the number of Sybil identities, 
nS
2. Updating resources in R
3.  Choosing  a  opt imal  k  for  resource 
distribution in the subsequent time interval
...
Fig. 2. Dynamic resource distribution. The distributor selects an optimal k based on its estimate for the confrontation.
4.3.1. Adversary evaluation
From the perspective of the distributor, adversary’s Sybil identities is unknown. However, (3) gives him a way
to estimate it from the number of unreachable resources. The estimated Sybil identities is given by (6).
nS = log1−k/m (1 − m˜/m) (6)
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At the end of the current time interval, the distributor can obtain the value of m˜ by probing the reachability of
each resource. Besides, m and k are already known variables to the distributor. All variables in the right part of
(6) are known to the distributor, so, (6) can be used to estimate the number of Sybil identities that the adversary
invests in the current time interval.
4.3.2. Parameter optimization
As mentioned above, the distributor will update R at the beginning of a new time interval. After the update,
each resource in R is online and reachable for service. And the adversary will start a new round of enumeration
attack with all its Sybil identities. As a result, the new time interval can be viewed as a new confrontation situation.
For the purpose of accessibility improvement, k should be chosen properly to maximize Acc as shown in (5).
The partial derivative of Acc with respect to k is given by the left part of (7). We assume the estimate of
adversary’s ability in the former time interval still holds in the new confrontation situation. As a result, k is the
only unknown variable in (7) to the distributor. The solution (or integers mostly near the solution) for Equation
(7) is the optimal value for k that maximizes accessibility in the new confrontation situation.
∂Acc
∂k
= −
[
1 − (1 − k
m
)nS
]k {
ln
[
1 − (1 − k
m
)nS
]
+
knS (1 − k/m)ns−1
m
[
1 − (1 − k/m)nS ]
}
= 0 (7)
It’s not trivial to solve (7). Moreover, the cost of enumerating every possible value of k (from 1 to m) and
selecting the one that maximize Acc in (5) is acceptable. Thus, we use a brute-force algorithm for the selection of
parameter k in the following experiments.
5. Experiment and Result
In this section, we present a few scenarios and adopt simulation to explore the eﬀectiveness of the former
presented analysis.
5.1. Evaluating adversary’s Sybil identities
The ﬁrst experiment is used to test the adversary evaluation method presented in Sec. 4.3.1. In this experiment,
the distributor has a set ofm = 1000 resources and distributes k = 3 resources randomly to any user who request for
them. We assume the adversary performs an enumeration attack with nS Sybils. After the attack, the distributor
makes a estimate for the number of Sybils based on (6). In this experiment, we vary nS from 50 to 1000, and
average the results over 5 simulation runs. As shown in Fig. 3, the estimates ﬁt perfectly along the scenarios
settings.
Fig. 3. Evaluating adversary’s Sybil identities
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5.2. Static resource distribution VS. Dynamic resource distribution
Consider the following scenario: in the ﬁrst time interval, the infrastructure has m0 resources; at the beginning
of the second time interval (e.g., 24 hours later), the number of resources increase by 20% due to resource update;
and in the third time interval, it falls to 60% of that in the second interval. m0 is set to be 500, 1000, 1500 and
2000 respectively in this experiment. We assume the number of adversary’s Sybils stays stable throughout the three
time intervals as nS = 400. The number of users is set to be n = 5000, which lead nH = 4600 users to be honest.
Any honest user who gets at least one reachable resource from the distributor will consider the infrastructure as
accessible. Thus, the accessibility in this simulation experiment is calculated as the number of honest users who
can get access to the infrastructure divided by nH . Accessibilities are compared under two diﬀerent distribution
strategies:
• Static Resource Distribution. The distributor distribute k0 = 3 resources to each user in every time interval.
• Dynamic Resource Distribution. The distributor sets k0 = 3 in the ﬁrst time interval. And in the following
two time intervals, k is selected dynamically using the method presented in Sec.4.3 based on its estimate for
the confrontation situation (see Fig. 2).
Fig. 4 shows how dynamic resource distribution outperform static resource distribution in improving accessi-
bility. In the ﬁrst time interval, both strategies perform as well as each other since k is set to be the same (k = 3).
In the second and third time intervals, the value of k is optimized by the dynamic resource distribution strategy,
thus we can observe a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between Acc under diﬀerent strategies. For example, under the setting
m0 = 500, the distributor with static resource distribution strategy distributes 3 resources to each user in each
time interval. However, the distributor with dynamic resource distribution strategy distributes 3 resources to each
user in the ﬁrst time interval, and set k = 1 in the second and third time intervals based on its estimate for the
adversary. As a result, dynamic resource distribution strategy leads to an accessibility about 3 times as high as that
under static resource distribution strategy in the third time interval of setting m0 = 500. This experiment validates
the eﬀectiveness of dynamic adjustment. It shows that the idea of adjusting distribution parameters dynamically
should be adopted as a supplement to current distribution strategies.
Fig. 4. Static resource distribution VS. Dynamic resource distribution. The accessibility under both static and dynamic resource distribution
strategies is shown in this ﬁgure with diﬀerent point shapes. The optimal value of k selected in each time interval is also depicted.
6. Conclusion and Future Work
Resource distribution is an essential problem in circumvention proxy infrastructures. This paper gives the
model of resource distribution problem under enumeration attacks. Based on this model, our probabilistic analysis
shows how a few factors in resource distribution can inﬂuence the infrastructure’s accessibility. We also present
the idea of dynamic resource distribution, where the distribution parameter can be adjusted based on distributor’s
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estimate for the confrontation situation dynamically. The experiments validate the eﬀectiveness of this idea and
show its potential in improving accessibility.
We will further our work to combine this idea with the state-of-art algorithms to design more practical resource
distributing strategies. Thus, research can be carried out in the following two possible aspects: (i) Studying the
resource distribution model of infrastructures with frequently updated resources like [18] [19]. (ii) Exploring
practical methods to distinguish honest users from adversary’s Sybils [20] [13] [14] [15]. Besides the resource
enumeration attack, we will consider the problem of accessibility improvement under other practical attacks in the
future, e.g., resource harvesting [21] and service denying attacks[22].
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